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Abstract
In order to be able to devise successful strategies for destabilizing terrorist organizations it
is vital to recognize and understand their structural properties. This paper deals with the opti-
mal communication structure of terrorist organizations when considering the tradeo® between
secrecy and operational e±ciency. We use elements from game theory and graph theory to
determine the `optimal' communication structure a covert network should adopt. Every covert
organization faces the constant dilemma of staying secret and ensuring the necessary coordina-
tion between its members. For several di®erent secrecy and information scenarios this dilemma
is modeled as a game theoretic bargaining problem over the set of connected graphs of given
order. Assuming uniform exposure probability of individuals in the network we show that the
Nash bargaining solution corresponds to either a network with a central individual (the star
graph) or an all-to-all network (the complete graph) depending on the link detection probabil-
ity, which is the probability that communication between individuals will be detected. If the
probability that an individual is exposed as member of the network depends on the information
hierarchy determined by the structure of the graph, the Nash bargaining solution corresponds
to cellular-like networks.
Keywords: covert networks, terrorist networks, Nash bargaining, game theory, information, secrecy.
JEL classi¯cation: C50, C78.
21 Introduction
Terrorist networks inside the Western world pose a challenge to the security environment (Ver-
maat 2002). Furthermore it is known that Europe is a key staging ground for jihadi activities
(Vidino 2007). These terrorist organizations are often characterized as cellular organizations com-
posed of quasi-independent cells and distributed command (Tsvetovat 2005). In addition they are
characterized as being organized decentralized rather than hierarchical (Tucker 2001). It is also
recognized that there are terrorist organizations that operate according to organizational structures
that lie somewhere between hierarchical and completely decentralized (Mishal 2005). Terrorist or-
ganizations are aware of the importance of their network structure and take this explicitly into
account when conducting operations: in a video lecture captured after the fall of Afghanistan in
2001 Mousab al Suri (aka Mustafa Nasar the Syrian, an alleged Al Qaeda a±liate) discusses the
structure a covert organization should adopt (Bergen 2006). He indicates that certain network
structures should be avoided to ensure the secrecy of the organization. Similar considerations are
taken into account in the ¯eld of military swarming. Here units resemble an array of dispersed
nodes set to act as an all-channel network. The challenge is to design military networks that depend
on stealth and secrecy. In this case the three most common designs are the `path' the `star' and
the `complete' graph structure. However, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) argue that hybrid forms
are also good candidates.
Explicit topologies of covert networks, based on theoretical considerations, are usually not
provided. Therefore, it is important to develop a more general framework in which the structure of
a covert network can be predicted and analyzed. Terrorist organizations, and more in general covert
organizations, constantly face the dilemma between secrecy and operational capability. Baker and
Faulkner (1993) discuss the structure of covert organizations and conclude that the requirement for
secrecy distinguishes the covert organization from the overt organization: "every secret organization
has to solve a fundamental dilemma: how to stay secret and at the same time ensure the necessary
coordination and control of its members". In this paper we analyze the question which network
structure design should be adopted taking the above mentioned dilemma explicitly into account.
That is, we consider both secrecy and information processing e±ciency as key network design
parameters and we analyze several di®erent scenarios corresponding to di®erent assumptions on
those parameters. The ¯rst scenario corresponds to the situation of a covert operation in its initial
phase in a hostile environment. We assume that it is equally likely for network members to be
exposed and upon exposure of an individual all communication of this individual with others is
detected. In the second scenario we assume that an initial operation is conducted in an environment
of varying hostility. That is, we assume that there is a certain ¯xed probability that communication
of any exposed individual with others is intercepted. Finally, we consider the scenario of a covert
operation in a hostile environment that passed its initial stage. That is, we assume that exposure
of an individual depends on his centrality with regard to information exchange and upon exposure
all his communication with others is detected.
The relationships between individuals in a covert organization are modeled as a graph. A vertex
can be interpreted as either an individual, a terrorist cell or a military unit. In the latter two cases
we view a cell (or unit) as a single operational entity and we are interested in the communication
structure among cells (units). There exists an edge between two individuals whenever there is an
exchange of information between the corresponding vertices on a regular basis. The exchange of
information for instance may represent the fact that one individual facilitates weapons or false
documents to another, or it may represent target selection information exchange between di®ering
cells. The underlying idea is that for the covert organization to execute a mission successfully
cooperation and coordination are necessary.
3Secrecy will be de¯ned by using two parameters: the exposure probability and the link detection
probability. In di®erent scenarios these parameters will be varied. The information measure is
modeled in two ways, mainly to check the robustness of our results. First the average distance
is used in de¯ning the network performance in the sense of information. Second a worse-case
performance bound of information exchange is taken by modeling the information measure using
the diameter of the underlying graph. Under the assumption of uniform exposure probability of
network members (an operation in its initial stage) we will show that either the all-to-all graph or
star graph is the optimal design solution, depending on the link detection probability. We show
that cellular networks are optimal if the exposure probability of network members depends on the
network structure.
In section 2 graph theoretical preliminaries will be discussed. The tradeo® between information
and secrecy, and the corresponding Nash bargaining problem, will be discussed in section 3. In
section 4 (approximate) optimal covert networks will be established for several di®erent scenarios
regarding secrecy. To indicate the robustness of the results a variation on the information measure
and its corresponding optimal networks will be discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Graph Theoretical Preliminaries
In this section we present preliminaries from graph theory. For a general overview we refer to
Bollobas (1998). Note that the word graph and network will be used interchangeably throughout
the text.
A graph g is an ordered pair (V;E), where V represents the ¯nite set of vertices and the set of
edges E is a subset of the set of all unordered pairs of vertices. An edge fi;jg connects the vertices
i and j and is also denoted by ij. The order of a graph is the number of vertices jV j and the size
equals its number of edges jEj. The set of all graphs of order n and size m is denoted with G(n;m).
The set of graphs of order n is denoted by Gn. In this paper we are only interested in connected
graphs because we study the organizational form of groups in which the actions of individuals are
coordinated. Therefore each graph under consideration is assumed to be connected. The degree
of a vertex is the number of vertices to which it is connected. We denote the degree of vertex i
in graph g by di(g). The star graph on n vertices is denoted by gn
star. We denote a ring graph of
order n with gn
ring and a path graph of order n with gn
path. A complete graph of order n is denoted
with gn
comp. See Figure 1 for an illustration of these graphs of order 5. The shortest distance (in
number of edges one has to travel) between vertex i and j is called the geodesic distance between i
and j. The geodesic distance between vertices i;j in g is denoted by lij(g). Clearly, lij(g) = lji(g).
We will write lij instead of lij(g) if there can be no confusion about the graph under consideration.







diameter D(g) of a graph g = (V;E) is de¯ned to be the maximum over the geodesic distances
between all pairs of vertices, i.e. D(g) = max(i;j)2V £V lij(g). Furthermore, we assume without loss
of generality that n ¸ 3.
4Example 1: In ¯gure 1 a star graph, a ring graph, a path graph and a complete graph, all of
order 5, are provided.
Figure 1: Star graph of order 5 (top left), ring graph of order 5 (top right), path graph of order 5










Table 1: Total distance and diameter for several order 5 graphs
We list the total distance and diameter of each graph in Table 1. For instance, the star graph
g5
star has one vertex with distance 1 to all the other vertices (the center vertex) and all other vertices
have distance 1 to the center vertex and distance 2 to the remaining three vertices. Therefore
T(g5
star) = 4 + 4(1 + 2 ¢ 3) = 32. Clearly, the maximum of the geodesic distances in the star graph
equals 2: D(g5
star) = 2.
For the four standard types of graphs the total distances are provided in Lemma 2.1, the proof of
which can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 2.1
(i) T(gn







4 if n is odd
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comp) = n(n ¡ 1)
53 The Tradeo® between Information and Secrecy
Usually in graphs the time delay for sending information from one vertex to the other is assumed to
be proportional to the number of edges the information must travel. In covert networks the higher
the number of edges a `message' must travel the more likely it becomes that it will be intercepted.
The average performance, I(g), of a network g 2 Gn in the sense of information is therefore de¯ned





Since T(g) ¸ n(n¡1) for any g 2 Gn it follows that 0 · I(g) · 1. If I(g) > I(g0), then in network g
it is easier (in an average sense) to send information around than in network g0. If everybody is able
to communicate with everybody else, information can °ow freely which gives the best information
performance: I(gn
comp) = 1.
Example 2: Consider the complete graph g5
comp, the star graph g5
star, the path graph g5
path and
the ring graph g5
ring as in Example 1. It follows that I(g5











The performance of the network g = (V;E) in sense of secrecy will be indicated by S(g). We
assume that there are two factors for each individual in the network that contribute to this secrecy.
Consider for instance the case of Nawaf al Hazmi, selected by Bin Laden as one of the suicide
operatives for the 9-11 operation. As discussed in the 9-11 Commission Report: "U.S. intelligence
would analyze communications associated with Midhar whom they identi¯ed during this travel,
and Hazmi, whom they could have identi¯ed but did not." (Kean et al. 2002). Thus ¯rst, there
is a certain probability ®i(g) that upon surveillance individual i will be exposed as member of the
network, and second if i is detected he will expose a fraction of the network which is represented
by 1 ¡ ui(g).





where ui re°ects the fraction of the network that remains unexposed when i is detected. This
measure thus re°ects the expected fraction of the network that remains undetected. Furthermore
we de¯ne,
¹(g) = S(g)I(g) (1)
as a total performance measure or criterion to compare graphs. A motiviation for this choice is
provided below.
Imagine that there are two agents responsible for setting up a covert operation, one tasked with
minimizing the danger of exposure and the other one tasked with ensuring su±cient communication
possibilities between members. The agents bargain over the set of all possible connected networks.
The bargaining will eventually result in a network structure. This approach di®ers from traditional
network formation models where equilibrium requirements are analyzed such that individuals do
not bene¯t from altering the structure of the network. In those models network formation is
considered to be a local process (see for instance Jackson 2001). Individuals form or break links
according to some local criterion. Instead, we consider the formation of a network in such a way
that all individuals are willing to adopt a global network structure that is optimal (in a bargaining
sense) in the possibility to coordinate while maintaining secrecy.
6We thus model the problem of ¯nding an optimal graph of given order by analyzing the tradeo®
between secrecy and operational e±ciency as a two-person ¯nite Nash bargaining problem. A two-
person ¯nite bargaining problem is a pair (F;0) where F ½ R2 is a ¯nite set of feasible outcomes and
0 2 F represents the disagreement point. Let B denote the class of all ¯nite bargaining problems
of this type. In our setting the set of feasible outcomes equals F¤ ´ f(S(g);I(g))jg 2 Gng, where
each point (S;I) 2 F¤ corresponds to those graphs g 2 Gn with secrecy measure S(g) = S and
information measure I(g) = I.
A bargaining solution Á assigns to each (F;0) 2 B a non empty subset Á((F;0)) of F. The Nash
bargaining solution, N(F;0), is de¯ned by
N(F;0) = argmax fx1x2jx = (x1;x2) 2 Fg for all (F;0) 2 B:
In our application the Nash bargaining solution will lead to those graphs that maximize the product
of secrecy and information measure, that is
N(F¤;0) = argmax f¹(g) = S(g)I(g)jg 2 Gng:
The Nash bargaining solution can be motivated on the basis of the following general properties
which have a strong appeal in our application framework.
1. For all x = (x1;x2) 2 Á((F;0)): if t = (t1;t2) such that t1 > x1 and t2 > x2, then t 62 F
2. Let F be such that for all (x1;x2) 2 F it also holds that (x2;x1) 2 F. Then (x1;x2) 2 Á((F;0))
implies (x2;x1) 2 Á((F;0)).
3. If F ½ G and Á(G) \ F 6= ;, then Á(F) = Á(G) \ F.
4. Let ¿ : R2 7! R2 be a positive linear transformation given by ¿(x) = (¸1x1;¸2x2), with
¸1;¸2 > 0, for all x = (x1;x2) 2 R2. Then Á(¿(F)) = ¿(Á(F)).
The ¯rst property, called Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), translated to our framework, states
that for any `optimal graph' there can not be another graph which has both a higher secrecy
measure and information measure. The second property of Symmetry (SYM) simply states that the
secrecy measure and information measure are equally relevant. The third property, Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), states that if the set of networks about which the agents bargain
is reduced, those solutions of the larger bargaining problem that are still available should form
the solutions of the smaller bargaining problem. The ¯nal property, covariance with positive scale
transformations (COV), states that a positive scaling of the secrecy and information measure (i.e.,
changing units of measurement) rescales the bargaining outcome in the corresponding way. In fact,
the Nash bargaining solution is characterized by the above four properties:
Theorem 3.1 (Mariotti 1998) Let Á be a bargaining solution on B. Then Á = N(F;0) if and only
if Á satis¯es WPO, SYM, IIA and COV.
4 Optimal Structures of Covert Networks
In this section we analyze several di®erent scenarios and present network design solutions for each.
In section 4.1 it is assumed that individuals in the network are exposed randomly and that upon
exposure of an individual all his links with other members are detected. The main result under
those assumptions is that the network's optimal structure is that of a star graph.
In section 4.2 it is assumed that with probability p communication over a link will be detected
independently and identically for all links. It will be shown that the optimal network structure will
be that of the complete graph for low values of p, and the star graph for high values of p, extending
7the result of section 4.1. Finally, in section 4.3 it is shown that if the network structure is taken
into account in de¯ning the exposure probability of individuals and that if upon exposure all links
of this individual are detected the resulting optimal network structures are cellular. Exact results
are given for n · 7 and algorithms are developed to analyze higher order graphs.
4.1 Scenario 1: Detecting all links of an exposed individual
Initially we de¯ne the secrecy individual i `contributes' to the network as the fraction of individuals
that remain unexposed when upon monitoring individual i all his links with his neighbors are
detected. That is, for g 2 Gn




Moreover we set ®i = 1
n. That is, we assume that individuals are uniformly exposed as being a
member of the network.

















n2 ¡ n ¡ 2m
T(g)
: (2)
Example 3: Reconsider the graphs of Example 1. The values for the secrecy measure, informa-
tion measure and total performance measure of order 5 graphs corresponding to the ¯rst scenario



























comp 0 1 0
Table 2: Secrecy, information and bargaining criterion of order 5 graphs, scenario 1.
We will show that no graph of order n performs better than gn
star. To do this we ¯rst derive a
lower bound for the total distance T(g).
Lemma 4.1 Let g 2 G(n;m). Then T(g) ¸ 2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2m
Proof: Since g has size m, there are exactly m tuples fi;jg of vertices for which lij = 1. For all other
n(n¡1)
2 ¡m tuples fi;jg it holds that lij ¸ 2. Hence T(g) ¸ (m+2(
n(n¡1)
2 ¡m))¢2 = 2n(n¡1)¡2m.
2
8Theorem 4.1 ¹1(gn
star) ¸ ¹1(g) for all g 2 Gn




2(n¡1) or equivalently, T(g) < (2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 4m)n¡1
n¡2.
However, one readily checks that (2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 4m)n¡1
n¡2 · 2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2m.
Hence, T(g) < 2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2m, contradicting Lemma 4.1.2
4.2 Scenario 2: Detecting links with probability p
In this paragraph we assume that whenever an individual in the network is being monitored com-
munication between him and one of his neighbors is detected independently with probability p.
The case where p = 1 therefore corresponds to the ¯rst scenario as analyzed in the previous sec-
tion. If individual i has di neighbors the number of neighbors that will be detected is binomially
distributed. Consequently we de¯ne,
ui(g) = 1 ¡
pdi + 1
n
and again assume ®i = 1
n. Therefore we have, for g 2 G(n;m)
S2(g) =
n2 ¡ n ¡ 2pm
n2 :
With I(g) as before we ¯nd
¹2(g) = S2(g)I(g) =
n2 ¡ n
n2 ¢
n2 ¡ n ¡ 2pm
T(g)
: (3)
For low values of p the complete graph maximizes ¹2.
Theorem 4.2 If p 2 [0; 1
2], then ¹2(gn
comp) ¸ ¹2(g) for all g 2 Gn .
Proof: Note that T(gcomp) = n(n ¡ 1) and hence ¹2(gn
comp) = n2¡n
n2 ¢ (1 ¡ p). Suppose there
exists a g 2 G(n;m) such that ¹2(g) > ¹2(gn
comp) then
n2¡n¡2pm
T(g) > (1 ¡ p), or equivalently
T(g) <
n2¡n¡2pm
1¡p . However, one readily checks that for all p 2 [0; 1
2]
n2¡n¡2pm
1¡p · 2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2m.
Hence T(g) < 2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2m, contradicting Lemma 4.1.2
For high values of p we extend the result of the previous section (p = 1).
Theorem 4.3 If p 2 [1
2;1], then ¹2(gn
star) ¸ ¹2(g) for all g 2 Gn
Proof: Note that T(gn




2(n¡1). Suppose there exists a








n¡2p . For p 2 [1
2;1] however, it is readily veri¯ed that
2(n¡1)(n2¡n¡2pm)
n¡2p · 2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2m, contradicting Lemma 4.1.2
In case p = 1
2 it follows from Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 that ¹2 is maximal for both gstar and
gcomp. However, for p = 1







94.3 Scenario 3: Non-uniform exposure probability
Up to now we assumed that ®i = 1
n for all i 2 V . It can be argued that this is the case when a covert
operation is in its initial phase. However, if an operation passed its initial stage the probability of
exposure will vary among network members. This because certain individuals, due to a more central
position in the network, are more likely to be discovered. We model this `information centrality'
by the equilibrium distribution of a random walk on the graph. This random walk chooses its next
vertex at random from the neighbors of the current vertex including itself. For g 2 G(n;m), the
equilibrium distribution is denoted by ¼ = (¼1;:::;¼n) and is given by ¼i = di+1
2m+n, see for instance
Tijms (2003). We set ®i = ¼i and choose,






























We obtain explicit expressions of equation ¹3 for the standard graphs. The proof is straight-














n3 if n is even
4(n¡3)



























10Figure 2: Optimal graphs for scenario 3 for n 2 f2;:::;7g, with average information measure.
The graphs g 2 Gn that maximize ¹3(g) for n = 2;:::;7 are shown in ¯gure 2.
It can be seen that the optimal networks adopt a cellular structure. For large values of n it
is not possible to calculate exact solutions and we resort to a simulation technique. We provide
two algorithms to approximate the graph that maximizes ¹3. The ¯rst algorithm (I) randomly
generates a graph. Each edge is present with probability 1
2. If the resulting graph g is connected
¹3(g) is computed and stored. Next another graph g0 is generated and ¹3(g0) is compared to ¹3(g).
If ¹3(g0) > ¹3(g) the graph g is replaced by g0. If not, g is kept. This process is iterated for 500.000
times.
The second algorithm (II) is local in nature. The starting point is a connected graph g of small
size (a tree or a ring graph for instance) for which ¹3(g) is computed. Next edges are randomly
added one by one as long as this increases the value of ¹3. The algorithm ends when adding a single
edge does not increase the value of ¹3. Di®erent starting graphs may result in di®erent outcomes.
Therefore several starting graphs are tried and the one yielding the graph g0 with maximum ¹3(g0)
is selected. Finally, the outcomes of algorithm I and II are compared and the graph with the highest
value for ¹3 is selected as the approximate solution for our ¹3 maximization problem.
Figure 3: Local optimization starting graphs (top left and down left) and their resulting approxi-
mate optimal graphs (top right and down right respectively).
Example 6: Consider n = 9. Using algorithm I we generated and compared 500.000 connected
graphs yielding the best graph shown in Figure 3 above (down right) with a total performance
measure of 0:3348. The second algorithm was run starting from several di®erent small order graphs
11of which two are shown in the same ¯gure. Local optimization starting from the down left tree
resulted in the down right graph, the same as resulted from algorithm I. Starting algorithm II
from the top left graph resulted in the graph g shown in the top right, for which ¹3(g) = 0:3355.
Actually, using other initial graphs did not yield a graph with a higher value of ¹3.
In Figure 4 we present the results of this process for graphs of order n = 8;9; and 10 respectively.
Figure 4: Approximate optimal graphs for scenario 3, for order 8,9 and 10.
It can be seen that for n = 10 the Petersen graph appears to approximate the optimal one.
Finally Figure 5 depicts approximate optimal graphs for some larger values of n: n = 25 and
n = 40.
Figure 5: Approximate optimal graphs for scenario 3, for n=25 (left) and n=40 (right), average
information measure.
It can be seen that for n = 25 a cellular structure emerges. The degree varies between 5 and
7. For the approximate optimal graph of order 40 also cellular structures appear but now it can
be seen that a central individual emerges (not connected to everyone but with high degree) around
which smaller cells are distributed.
125 A Variation on the Information Measure
The analysis so far has been conducted with information performance measured by the (normalized)
reciprocal of the total distance in the network. This information measure represented the average
performance of the network with respect to the exchange of information. Here we repeat the
analysis, using an information measure taking worst case performance into account. Actually,
in considering problems in communication over networks or circuit layout optimization often the
diameter is considered to be the decisive parameter (Chung 1987). We de¯ne the worst case





We use the upper bar to explicitly di®erentiate this measure from the information measure used
before. Obviously 0 · I(g) · 1 and I(gcomp) = 1. Moreover, if I(g) > I(g0), then worst case
performance in g is better than in g0.
First consider scenario 1: uniform exposure probability and detection of all links. For g 2
G(n;m) with,
S1(g) =
n2 ¡ n ¡ 2m
n2
and I(g) as in equation (5) we have,
¹1(g) = S1(g)I(g) =
n2 ¡ n ¡ 2m
D(g)n2 : (6)
It turns out that gn
star maximizes ¹1 over Gn.
Theorem 5.1 For all g 2 Gn, ¹1(gn
star) ¸ ¹1(g)
Proof: Let g 2 G(n;m). Clearly m ¸ n¡1 (we only consider connected graphs). With ¹1(gn
star) =
(n¡1)(n¡2)
2n2 it follows readily that ¹1(g) > ¹1(gstar) implies D(g) < 2. This however would lead to
D(g) = 1 and thus g = gcomp. Since ¹1(gcomp) = 0 we arrive at a contradiction. 2
Next we consider scenario 2 with a probability p of link detection, again assuming uniform
exposure of individuals. Using the worst case performance information measure I(g) and secrecy
measure
S2(g) =
n2 ¡ n ¡ 2pm
n2
we have for all g 2 G(n;m),
¹2(g) = S2(g)I(g) =
n2 ¡ n ¡ 2pm
D(g)n2 (7)
Theorem 5.2 For all g 2 Gn and all p 2 [0;1], we have,
(i) ¹2(gn
comp) ¸ ¹2(g) if p · n
2(n¡1)
(ii) ¹2(gn
star) ¸ ¹2(g) if p ¸ n
2(n¡1)




n2 and ¹2(gstar) =
n2¡n(1+2p)+2p
n2 . Therefore ¹2(gn
comp) ¸ ¹2(gn
star) if and
only if p · n
2(n¡1). 2
13Finally we analyze scenario 3 (non-uniform exposure probability). With secrecy measure for
g 2 G(n;m) given by
S3(g) =






¹3(g) = S3(g)I(g) =






The graphs g 2 Gn that maximize ¹3 for n 2 f2;:::;7g are provided in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Optimal graphs for scenario 3 with n 2 f2;:::;7g, worst-case information measure.
It can be seen that the optimal graphs are similar to those for scenario 3 with I(g) =
n(n¡1)
T(g)
(see ¯gure 2). Only the optimal graph of order n = 4 is di®erent. This shows the robustness of our
results.
Finally we present approximate optimal graphs for larger orders, using the same approximation
technique as explained in the section 4.
Figure 7: Approximate optimal graphs for scenario 3 with n=25 (left) and n=40 (right), worst-case
information measure.
146 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the dilemma every covert organization faces: how to stay secret
and at the same time ensure good coordination. We modeled the structure of a covert organization
as an undirected graph. The vertices can either be interpreted as individuals in the organization,
military units or as terror cells. The selection of the optimal organizational structure was modeled
as a bargaining problem between an agent responsible for the secrecy of the organization and
another one responsible for ensuring operational e±ciency.
Di®erent scenarios were developed and analyzed by assigning a speci¯c information measure
and a speci¯c secrecy measure to the set of connected graphs. The ¯rst scenario corresponded
to a covert organization conducting an operation in its initial stage, in a hostile environment.
We established that centralizing information °ow by adopting a star network is optimal. The
second scenario consisted of a covert organization in its initial stages in an environment of varying
hostility. We established that all-to-all communication is optimal in a friendly environment (for
instance in a safe-house) and that the star network is optimal in a hostile environment. Finally, the
communication structure of a covert network that passed its initial stages in a hostile environment
was analyzed (i.e., jihadi networks in Europe). In the event of such a scenario we established that
cellular networks are optimal.
Our results are consistent with the apparent organizational forms of current terrorist networks,
particularly Al Qaeda's `network of networks'. The results are of twofold use. First they predict the
structure of terrorist networks which is important to be able to detect and combat them. Second
they aid in the design of military network structures that have to depend on stealth and secrecy
(i.e., military swarming). Finally, the analysis in this paper presents a quantitative theoretical
framework for reasoning about covert networks.
15A Appendix
Proof of lemma 2.1:
(i) Denote the center vertex of gn
star with index c. Clearly
P
i2V lci(gn











n ¡ 1 + (n ¡ 1)(2n ¡ 3) = 2(n ¡ 1)2.
(ii) First consider the case when n is odd. Then for all i 2 V :
P
j2V lij(gn




4 . Hence, T(gn
ring) =
(n¡1)n(n+1)
4 for the case that n is odd. In case n is even
it follows that for all i 2 V :
P
j lij(gn
ring) = 2(1 + 2 + ::: + (n





4 in case n is even.
(iii) There are n¡1 tuples fi;jg such that lij(gn
path) = 1, n¡2 tuples fi;jg such that lij(gn
path) =
2,..., 1 tuple fi;jg such that lij(gn
path) = n ¡ 1. Each tuple has to be counted twice, therefore
T(gn
path) = 2f(n ¡ 1) + 2(n ¡ 2) + 3(n ¡ 3) + ::: + (n ¡ 1)(n ¡ (n ¡ 1))g









n ¢ n(n ¡ 1)
2
¡




(n ¡ 1)n(n + 1)
3
(iv) For all i 2 V it holds that
P
j2V lij(gn
comp) = n ¡ 1. Thus T(gn
comp) = n(n ¡ 1). 2
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